

Chair's Summary

Review of key issues

The purpose of this conference has been to study how to coordinate better International Post-Disaster and Peacebuilding Missions. As a result, the Chair's Summary is limited to issues that fit within this theme.

Theme I: Introduction

Current Practices in Co-ordinating Post-Disaster and Peacebuilding Missions

One speaker declared that international organizations and national governments are struggling with the challenges of coordinating international responses to crises or disasters. Advances in international norms have led to increased obligations. More international organizations are facing new demands without having worked out the best division of responsibilities. The number of domestic participants has increased raising issues of roles and coordination in humanitarian activities, reconstruction, and military assistance.

In response, the Canadian foreign ministry has established the \$100 million Global Peace and Security Fund to finance projects that are neither development nor military in nature. It has also established the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) to coordinate Canadian involvement. This double approach links foreign policy and operational roles to funding. START is now working in Afghanistan, Darfur, Haiti, Columbia, Northern Uganda, and Lebanon.

The new approach was working. Nevertheless, there were problems in mobilizing and coordinating crisis responses. Inadequate or uncertain financing delays stabilization and can lead to new security problems. Mobilizing from within the government, the right civilian skills, at the right time with the right mechanisms and establishing operational platforms to perform in crisis situations is tough.

Coordination and cooperation between governments and NGOs had to be improved. Mutual respect was called for. NGOs are correctly concerned about the tradeoffs of greater integration of their efforts within the more politically driven agenda of donors and the international organizations.

It was noted that the United States Government is developing a new management system for post-conflict response designed to integrate civilian and military planning and operations at all levels. In Washington, there would be a Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group to coordinate policy and planning and facilitate partnerships with other governments and organizations. At the operational level, there is to be a short-term planning cell to be deployed to a U.S. or multinational military headquarters to assist with coordinating civilian and military planning. At the field level, Advance Civilian Teams

are to support the execution of plans for reconstruction and stabilization with or without U.S. military involvement.

NGOs, academic experts and others are contributing extensively to the new system. NGOs would ultimately be implementing many of the field programs, but would not be included in official policy planning, since it would create a conflict of interest if NGOs were to help design activities on which they later would be bidding.

In case of disaster, one NGO representative observed, the humanitarian actors come flooding in from all over the globe. There is no agreed coordination mechanism. There is woeful under-investment in humanitarian response in a number of critical areas. There has to be greater investment in preparedness capacity and assured advance funding. Since there is no global pre-funding mechanism, Canada should pre-qualify reputable and capable humanitarian agencies – UN, non-governmental and governmental. There should also be agreement on decision-making, division of labour and coordination of response to disasters in developing countries, including assessment of capacity and quality of those desiring to offer assistance. Canada has no coordinated system that would allow the deployment of human and material resources overseas in an efficient and coordinated way in an emergency. The most difficult issue is that of field coordination. In a disaster, civilian national and UN authorities need to be able to allocate tasks and coordinate the response among all actors. They cannot do so now. Competition and choice create waste, gaps, duplication, and unnecessary suffering.

Another participant noted that co-ordination was required in both post-disaster and peacekeeping missions. Much needs to be done to develop centralized knowledge about emergency responses. It is desirable - and feasible - to ensure the participation by the affected population in relief. Human rights observance is key among the many indicators of effectiveness. Development of approaches to gender equality is important. Continuous and co-ordinated monitoring and assessment of needs, effectiveness and impact against measurable and relevant indicators are increasingly connected to capacity to raise desperately needed funds and to sustain support for disaster-relief and peacekeeping missions.

Among the questions considered in the ensuing discussion was that of providing joint training for experts liable to be sent abroad on missions from both civilian and military branches of the government, and NGOs so that they could learn together to collaborate and coordinate when the time comes. It was questioned, however, whether the NGOs had sufficient staff to make some available for training. It was also queried whether the government departments had the resources to arrange such training. The suggestion was made that including NGO representatives in training offered by the Canadian Forces or at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre might solve the problem.

Theme II: Managing Post-Disaster Recovery Missions

Lessons from Previous Post-Disaster Recovery Missions

The conference considered the post-tsunami intervention of the Canadian Red Cross in Sri Lanka and Indonesia. This had been the Canadian Red Cross's largest operation to date. Coordination within the Red Cross was already a challenge because of the multiplicity of Red Cross agencies. The Red Cross usually worked through the national agencies. This did not always work well, because the local agency often did not have the capacity. The skill sets required in the relief phase and the recovery phase were not always the same. Furthermore, it had been very difficult to plan ahead because of enormity of the disaster.

Such a disaster attracts many organizations. Coordination with all the other organizations was a huge challenge. The Red Cross therefore had depended on the UN. The speaker advocated the cluster approach for co-ordination in such situations.

Another speaker noted formal coordination during humanitarian response is not especially effective. Such attempts often become endless rounds of meetings and discussion with little impact on the ground. One negating factor is the sheer number of parties involved with a wide range of motives, missions, and objectives. Furthermore meetings often do not include donor governments. Various nations respond with direct aid at the invitation of governments but not always in consultation with field coordination bodies. National NGO and community participation can be limited or non-existent.

Effective coordination however does frequently occur informally, particularly at field level.

The pre-planning stage is the place to address many of the factors that detract from coordination occurring during an event. Risk reduction or management are, however, not as yet seen as a priority area by most governments and actors.

In disaster relief, opportunities exist to build relationships then can then be applied to conflict events. Conflict environments are much more complex as political influences do not create an enabling environment. The whole of government approaches have yet to be implemented long enough to be proven effective or ineffective. Furthermore, different objectives and priorities make alignment difficult between governments and the NGOs. Governments have been all too eager to use humanitarian agencies as quivers in their military bows contrary to the fourth humanitarian principle – **We shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy.** Rights to assistance guaranteed under the Geneva conventions may be eroded by a security-centric approach.

While there is generally a good rapport and dialogue between the Canadian authorities and non-state actors, direct dialogue between NGOs and other governments is still rare.

In the following discussion it was observed that there should be a discussion on arrangements between national authorities and the NGOs ahead of time.

It was also emphasized that there had to be consultations with local partners so as to understand the impact of the multitude of foreign actors. One participant noted it was difficult to coordinate between NGOs. He suggested that the code of conduct of the Standing Committee on Humanitarian response should govern the international participation in disaster relief. More than one speaker called for an agency to coordinate NGO involvement in missions. Another person called for transparency, promoting awareness of other players and a common analysis in order to achieve coherence. One of the participants observed that parliamentarians were becoming impatient with NGOs.

Strengthening the Role of the UN in Post-Disaster Missions

It was observed that the UN plays a critical role in helping to solicit and manage international support for countries affected by natural disasters. Given the complexity of the global humanitarian system, ensuring a timely, effective and needs based response to natural disasters when they occur, and making sure such efforts harness rather than sideline national capacities is a challenge. While not a panacea, the UN brings a legitimacy and framework for coordination in response to natural disasters that is well respected. Following on lessons identified from the Indian Ocean tsunami, Pakistan and Yogyakarta earthquakes, new measures are being put in place under the leadership of the UN to increase the predictability and efficiency of post-disaster efforts, including the creation of funding mechanisms such as the Central Emergency Response Fund, and actions to strengthen the capacities of humanitarian coordinators and minimize gaps in key sectors like water, sanitation and protection. However, there are a number of things the UN must do to further augment its leadership and encourage greater collaboration across agencies, including developing better mechanisms to manage military assets; improving the continuity of surge staff and enhancing needs assessments across agencies; better harnessing local capacities; ensuring protection issues are effectively identified and addressed; promoting donor coherence in response and investments in risk reduction; and making progress in enhancing the transition from relief to recovery and reconstruction.

In the ensuing discussion, it was stated that Canada needed to give risk-reduction and natural hazards greater attention, but no decisions had been made on how to target better strategic investments in this area. In bilateral programs, there were community preparedness plans, better agricultural practices, investments in early-warning initiatives and the adoption of international disaster response laws to facilitate coordination in case of a natural disaster. There was a start to focussing as well on vulnerable populations.

In the case of catastrophic events, strategic support teams can be sent to reinforce the embassy that is responding to events. Local capacity can be reinforced by bringing local partners around the table, instead of ignoring them and making sure that local NGOs are part of the clusters.

There was a great deal of confidence in the UN Office of the Commissioner for Humanitarian affairs. It was the best shot at enhancing effectiveness of system of disaster response, and increasing credibility within donor public.

Theme III: Achieving complementarity between the civil and military components

Lessons to be drawn from Previous Peacebuilding operations

One speaker observed that NATO engagement in the Balkans forced a re-examination of the Alliance's internal procedures so as to accommodate new modes of military-civilian interaction. One will always encounter contending or sometimes conflicting organizational cultures and goals between the military on the one side, and civilian organizations on the other.

Overcoming the mutual and reciprocal negative perceptions is a task facing each nation-building mission. Humanitarian activities must be independent, although in practice there will always be some blurring of the lines between the military-civilian goals and the NGO sector. More coordination is needed between the military and the NGO sector, and the refinement of models of information sharing continuously requires attention.

Two additional issues have gained greater significance in the Afghanistan and Iraq missions: first, a competition for resources between the NGOs and the military, and second, inadequate training of personnel – both civilian and military – on civil-military relations.

One of the participants commented, however, that the military has active programs in civil-military relations and officers specializing in this area.

Another speaker found that there were three clear lessons about peace and nation-building from the post-conflict Balkans:

- In a hostile environment, it is only military force which can provide the first vestiges of humanitarian aid.
- Without security provided by military force, it is not possible for non-governmental agencies to deliver that aid.
- Without *sufficient* military force, it is not possible to forge the close links between the civilian and military components necessary for the long and difficult political transformation process which is seminal to peace and nation building.

One speaker, looking at Afghanistan, noted that there can be no civil reconstruction or civilian transformation without military security.

In the ensuing discussion, emphasis was placed on the importance of listening to Afghani civilians, being more respectful of voices of civil society. It was recognized that the NGOs' role can be jeopardized by presence of military. It was noted that the military were being educated on how to deal with the NGOs, but NGOs have to be given training in relations with the military.

Strengthening NATO's and the UN's Leadership Roles in Coordinating Peacebuilding Missions

One speaker noted that the co-ordination of international post-disaster and peacebuilding missions is premised upon trust. Furthermore, most field coordination will be *ad hoc* and *just-in-time*. NATO military are evolving their civil-military mechanisms to engender and maintain the trust of their civilian partners in such contexts. A very indicative emerging NATO practice is the use of CAADs (Civilian Actors Advisors) to be on staff and work alongside NATO military at all levels with a view to better informing military actions. It is likely that their most valuable role will be in cautioning military against trespassing on civilian functions.

When military unnecessarily propose or agree to undertake roles normally best carried out by civilians, they inadvertently become competitors with those they want to be partners with. A concrete example, of military boldly leaping into perceived breeches, is the Canadian Forces Strategic Advisory Team – Afghanistan (SAT-A): a Canadian military initiative to strengthening Afghan civilian ministries. Even superficial analysis would suggest that Canada had many other available experts that combined expertise on civilian-governance with expertise on how to mentor and effect sustainable capacity building with developing country officials. In addition, the SAT-A military initiative has negatively affected the trust between Canadian Forces and other Canadian government officials.

NATO's procedures for consultation, planning and decision making in support of operations, as well as its capabilities, must be more aware of and able to maximize the multitude of separate but mutually-dependent NATO and non-NATO actors. Equally, it is firmly accepted that interaction implies neither military control of civil organizations or agencies, nor the reverse. NATO is looking to move to the leading edge on how to be a trusted partner for civilian actors. They are designing and refining mechanisms and procedures that will have the effect of coordinating without leading, cooperating without encroaching, yet when appropriate, leading in what are clearly military tasks, but with minimal collateral damage to their civilian partners.

Turning to the UN, one speaker stated that our central political challenge at the UN – empowering the international community to intervene to protect - is made very difficult by the divisions within the world community between the haves and the have-nots, the democracies and non-democracies and between those wary of diluting the principle of non-interference in internal affairs and those who wish the UN to be powered to intervene.

Nevertheless, in a massive shift in thinking, the general framework of human security is becoming politically accepted, but with reservations, among members. One of the achievements of the 2005 summit was the adoption of a partial, but adequate formula to permit the UNSC to authorize the use of force for humanitarian protection.

While the case for humanitarian intervention has been tarnished by Iraq, the political prospects are becoming brighter – not for the creation anytime soon of a permanent rapid deployment force, but more likely for forces for future humanitarian crises with agreement on objectives that will match the challenge and rules of engagement aimed not at preserving conditions, but at changing them.

The political prospects are becoming brighter because there is more of a UNSC political consensus. The current leadership vacuum because the US is tied down in Iraq is likely temporary. The United States is returning to multilateralism. The attitude of the Russians and Chinese will depend on how hard we drive for partnership with them.

Canada could help the process by not pressing for declaratory agreements, but instead, working on case by case for success in each application on the ground. The wary non-interventionists will support specific interventions, but not a permissive theory beyond the 2005 Summits formulation on the responsibility to protect.

Another speaker noted that the UN has wrangled with the question of how to deliver more coordinated and effective peacebuilding for fifteen years. Four particular factors emerge that drive this need for improvement: (i) the immense number of immediate needs, such as food, security, housing and institutional development; (ii) the enormous capacity deficit faced by post-conflict administrations; (iii) the numerous and diverse actors in the post-conflict space; and (iv) the tendency of governments to focus on securing power as an inappropriate proxy for stability.

Three recent innovations have opened the way for new opportunities to improve. The newly developed Integrated Missions Planning Process, the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission, and the recent One UN report on system coherence all address different phases of international interventions. Helping a country emerge from conflict does not, however, involve a series of black and white phases with discrete boundaries. There is a constant need for balance so as to ensure that institutional and developmental processes are begun during the peacekeeping phase, and to maintain attention to political and security matters when the medium-term development processes have set in, and the UN mission leaves.

In order to achieve this, peacebuilding and peacebuilding actors must organize themselves to: (a) secure a sustainable cease-fire; and (b) build self-sustainable, participatory institutions of government that (c) deliver services in a transparent and effective manner, so as to secure (d) a self-enforcing peace that (e) provides the foundation for just and equitable sustainable development. These goals might provide a framework for all actors. We must also recognize we don't really know how to build state capacity – we need to do more, focus on this more, and research more. We also need to be explicit and practical about ceding ownership over programmes to national governments.

The Peace Building Commission and the Peace Building Support office must play an advisory role and examine strategies to serve this broader vision, as well as narrower

goals. Donors should make sustained commitments, engage for the medium term, and fund state capacity. NGOs must organize themselves around the state structure in service to national development plans and the specific goals of peacebuilding.

In the following discussion, the question was raised about the advisability of the Strategic Advisory Team assigned to the Afghan government. Several speakers considered that the SAT-A represented an intrusion of the Military into the civilian sphere and had contributed to the reluctance of civilian agencies to become involved in Kabul. Others understood the desire of the Canadian Forces to respond to a personal request from President Karzai to General Hillyer and doubted that the Public Service could have found 50 people with the requisite training in organization, planning, and execution. One speaker suggested that the roles and mandates should not be allowed to interfere with an effort to be helpful. Another doubted that SAT-A had in fact negatively affected the trust between Canadian Forces and other Canadian government officials.

On the UN, one participant pointed out that the UN Peace Building Commission had been slow to get started because of UN politics. Civilian activities should go to other organizations. Another speaker suggested that it would help UN reform if other states would set up CANADEM-type organizations to channel qualified candidates for UN posts.

A participant stated that Integrated Peace Support Operations, which had led to a significant decline in civilian deaths in the nineties, should be backed up by measures to stop financing fuelling conflict by a will to implement UN sanctions, an inventory should be drawn up of global peacekeeping capacity, and the UN should try to provide an impartial information flow in zones of conflict.

It was suggested that one way of reducing the politicization of appointments to the UN would be to adopt the OSCE's system of rosters whereby each country provides a list of possible candidates, from which the OSCE makes its selection.

Another participant pointed out that in the area of human security there were many and complex UN organizations. Was there not a possibility of rationalizing them to save money? In answer to a question, it was noted that the State Department had put the prevention of state failure or intra-state conflict within its purview, but few funds had been allocated for the purpose. While it was hard for the UN to name and shame countries heading toward conflict, the Secretary General could send a special envoy. The State Department was considering sending conflict advisers to countries about to go under.

Recommendations

Canada should make greater investment in preparedness capacity and advanced funding. The pre-planning stage is the place to address many of the factors that detract from coordination occurring during an event.

Canada should develop a system that would allow the deployment of human and material resources overseas in an efficient and coordinated way in an emergency.

It was the preponderance of opinions that providing joint training for experts from both the civilian and military sides of the government and the NGOs was required so that they could learn to collaborate and coordinate together abroad. It was questioned whether the NGOs had sufficient staff to make some available for training. It was also queried whether the government departments had the resources to arrange such training.

Canada should pre-qualify reputable and capable humanitarian agencies, based on an assessment of capacity and quality of those desiring to offer assistance. Such an arrangement might solve the problem of ensuring that the NGO experts got adequate training

It was the preponderance of opinion that in missions abroad, the authority of national and international authorities had to be recognized. Effective coordination was required to develop centralized knowledge, to ensure local participation, to allocate tasks and coordinate responses, and to monitor and assess needs, effectiveness, and impact against objective standards.

It was objected by some, that formal coordination during humanitarian response was not especially effective, while effective coordination did frequently occur informally, particularly at field level. Furthermore, different objectives and priorities made alignment difficult between governments and the NGOs and risked forcing the NGOs to operate contrary to the fourth humanitarian principle – **We shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy.** Rights to assistance guaranteed under the Geneva Conventions might be eroded by a security-centric approach, especially in areas of active conflict and evident security concerns

Canada might adopt the NATO system of using CAADs (Civilian Actors Advisors) to work alongside NATO military at all levels so as to better inform military actions, especially where they might trespass into civilian areas.

The UN should further augment its leadership and encourage greater collaboration across agencies, including:

- developing better mechanisms to manage military assets;
- improving the continuity of surge staff and enhancing needs assessments across agencies;
- better harnessing local capacities;
- ensuring protection issues are effectively identified and addressed;
- promoting donor coherence in response and investments in risk reduction; and
- making progress in enhancing the transition from relief to recovery and reconstruction.

UN Integrated Peace Support Operations should be supported by:

- implementing UN sanctions prohibiting financing of conflicts,
- drawing up an inventory of global peacekeeping capacity, and
- providing an impartial information flow in zones of conflict.

In order to reduce the politicization of appointments, the UN might adopt the OSCE's system of rosters whereby each country provides a list of possible candidates, from which the OSCE makes its selection.